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Do conditional cash transfers (CCT) raise educational attainment? 
A case study of Juntos in Peru 
Anja Gaentzsch* 
Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the impacts of Peru’s Conditional Cash Transfer 
(CCT) programme JUNTOS upon educational outcomes of beneficiary children. The 
findings associate Juntos participation with higher overall enrolment rates and grades 
of schooling for children aged 12 to 18 years. This effect translates into a higher 
probability of finishing primary school and entering secondary school for the same age 
group. Evidence suggests that this is linked to a faster progression through grades 
rather than final years of schooling. We find no impact on enrolment or school 
progression for younger children aged 6 to 11 years. Further, Juntos participation does 
not have a positive impact upon scores of receptive vocabulary and mathematics tests. 
Rather, children aged 7-9 years seem to make less progress over time compared to 
children from non-beneficiary families, while there is no impact upon older children. 
Evidence on the underlying reasons for this is inconclusive and merits further analysis. 
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Conditional cash transfers (CCT) are among the largest social assistance programmes 
in many Latin American countries. CCTs are targeted transfers to poor households that 
are conditional upon beneficiary families making pre-specified investments into the 
education and health care of their children. Typical CCTs require that school-aged 
children of beneficiary households are registered in school and attend classes while 
younger children and pregnant or lactating women need to attend regular health 
checks. As such, these programmes combine an immediate objective of poverty 
alleviation with a long-term one of enhancing intergenerational social mobility through 
promoting human capital investment. 
Peru started its CCT programme Programa Nacional de Apoyo a los más Pobres 
Juntos (National Programme to Support the Poorest Together), shortly referred to as 
Juntos, in 2005. This paper aims to evaluate its impact upon educational outcomes, 
specifically asking whether Juntos raises the educational attainment of beneficiary 
children. The analysis encompasses both the effect on the demand for education 
services in terms of participation, as well as the impact upon learning outcomes that 
may result from it. While better learning outcomes are not an explicit objective of the 
programme itself, CCTs implicitly build on the assumption that more schooling for 
children from poor families enhances social mobility in later life. Arguably, in order to 
reach this long-term objective, skills acquisition and enhanced learning are crucial 
determinants alongside mere school participation. 
The paper is structured as follows: this first section gives a brief introduction to 
theoretical considerations behind CCT programmes and the specific set-up of Juntos 
in Peru. The second section provides a literature review before introducing the data in 
the third section. The fourth section explains the identification strategy, while the fifth 
section outlines the empirical estimation results. The last section concludes. 
1.1 The rationale behind CCTs 
In the development policy debate, CCTs have been hailed as a promising lever to 
tackle under-investment into human capital through a demand-side intervention. Little 





poverty traps and foster an intergenerational transmission of poverty (Fiszbein et al., 
2009). Although in the bulk of countries where CCTs operate, public primary and 
secondary education is free of charge, large inequalities in school enrolment and 
completion rates among income groups persist. Table 1 shows that this is also the 
case in Peru, where net enrolment at primary level is almost balanced (average net 
enrolment of 92.9 respectively 93.3 percent for those classified as non-poor by the 
Peruvian government versus those classified as extremely poor) but significant 
disparities exist at the secondary level (86.5 versus 66.2 percent, respectively) 
(MINEDU, 2014).  
Table 1: Net school enrolment rates* in 2014 (by region and poverty status) 
  Extremely poor Non-poor Mean Rural Urban 
Primary 92,9 93,3 92,9 93,2 92,7 
Secondary 66,2 86,5 82,9 74,5 86,7 
Tertiary** 9,6 75,9 64,7 29,7 75,4 
 * The net enrolment rate refers to the percentage share of enrolled children of the official age group for 
a given level of education out of the total of this age group. 
** Includes all form of post-secondary education. 
 Source: MINEDU (2014) 
 
 
CCTs aim to tackle this by effectively subsidizing education through lowering its 
opportunity costs. Hence, a conditional transfer works through two channels: the 
transfer provides additional income to the household and thus relaxes a budget 
constraint, while the conditionality lowers the price of schooling relative to alternative 
time uses of children. This paper aims to investigate the overall impact of Juntos upon 
educational outcomes of beneficiary children.1 Specifically, it addresses the following 
two questions: 
                                            
 
1This overall impact may result from an income and/or substitution effect. Empirically, it is difficult to 
decompose any overall impact into an income and substitution effect unless through a randomized 
controlled trial that features both a conditional and an unconditional transfer, or with a structural model 
that estimates the parameters determining demand for schooling. Such decomposition, which would be 
insightful in order to assess for example the benefits of a conditional programme over an unconditional 





1) What has been the impact of Juntos upon school participation? 
2) Can programme participation be linked to impacts upon cognitive skills? 
Juntos began to operate in Peru in the second half of 2005. Starting on a small scale 
in some of the poorest regions of the country, it has since been rolled out to cover more 
than 750.000 households in nearly 60 percent of the country’s districts. The 
programme targets beneficiaries in eligible districts via a proxy-means test that takes 
into account demographic and socio-economic criteria. The conditionalities that the 
household has to meet in order to receive the cash transfer of 200 Nuevo Soles 
bimonthly per family (amounting to approximately US$ 107 in PPP terms2) are outlined 
in Table 2. Eligible families must comprise at least one member under 19 years of age 
or pregnant, and live in the district of enrolment for a minimum of six months before 
receiving a transfer. Children under the age of 6 have to attend regular health checks 
and receive vaccinations, while school-aged children between 6 and 14 have to be 
enrolled in school and attend a minimum of 85 percent of the classes. Pregnant or 
lactating women need to undergo pre- and post-natal health examinations. The uniform 
scheme as such is rather simple when compared to other CCTs in the region that 
differentiate transfer amounts for example by the number of children in the household 
(as for example in Colombia) or pay an education premium to girls and for advancing 
to higher grades (as for example in Mexico). 
Table 2: Juntos conditionalities 
Target group Conditionality Benefit 
Children under 
6 years 
Attendance of regular health  




(≈ US$ 35) 
Children aged 
6-14 years 
School attendance of at least 
85% of the school year 
Pregnant and lactating 
women 
Pre- and post-natal 
health checks 
 
                                            
 
2 The PPP exchange rate is based on the data provided by the International Comparison Group (ICP) 






2 Literature review 
CCT programmes in Latin America have been subject to numerous empirical impact 
evaluations. Broadly, these can be grouped into four categories (see Fiszbein, Schady, 
2009, Appendix B). The first one comprises evaluations of smaller scale pilot 
programmes that are based on random assignment. Examples are CCT programmes 
in Nicaragua and Honduras, where random assignment to treatment and control 
groups has worked well while attrition was low. Maluccio and Flores (2005) provide an 
impact evaluation of the Nicaraguan CCT Red de Protección Social using experimental 
design. The second category is also based on experimental design methods but 
studies larger scale programmes, thus raising fewer questions on external validity. The 
most prominent example is certainly Mexico’s Prospera3 programme which has been 
evaluated on many accounts. Evaluations include for example Skoufias (2005) who 
associates the CCT with more years of schooling and improved nutrition for poor 
children as well as better health outcomes for children and adults. Schultz (2004) has 
evaluated later stages of the programme in rural areas, where no control groups had 
been established anymore. Using a matching design combined with first-difference 
regression analysis, he concludes that the programme has a positive effect on 
schooling; this effect is largest for children in the age group of transition from primary 
to secondary school. 
The third category draws on studies where randomization was not possible or the 
control group was biased for various reasons. These studies use a regression 
discontinuity design (RDD): transfer eligibility is often determined by means-testing, 
where households falling below a certain poverty threshold are selected into the 
treatment group. RDD compares outcomes for households just below this cut-off point 
(treatment group) with those just above the threshold (control group). Osterbeek, 
Ponce and Schady (2008) have used this approach to evaluate the Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (BDH) programme in Ecuador. Since there was a significant amount of non-
eligible households just above the threshold that received transfers nonetheless, the 
                                            
 
3 At the start in 1997, the Mexican CCT programme was called Progresa, it then changed its name to 
Oportunidades in 2002 and was recently rebranded as Prospera. For simplification, this paper refers to 





authors additionally use an instrumental variable to control for this bias. They conclude 
that the programme had a positive effect on school enrollment for very poor 
households. The fourth category uses a quasi-experimental design with difference-in-
difference estimation, sometimes combining it with matching. For Colombia’s CCT 
Familias en Acción Attanasio et al. (2005) find that the programme has increased 
household consumption as well as school attendance of secondary school children for 
eligible children within the household. However, it has had no effect on ineligible 
siblings living in the same household. 
The objective of CCTs is to promote long-term investment into the human capital of 
children from impoverished households. To date, there are few studies that focus on 
learning outcomes rather than enrolment or school attendance rates. This is mainly 
due to the lack of available data on cognitive skills or test scores of children. This paper 
wants to make a contribution by evaluating the impact of Peru’s Juntos on the 
educational attainment of beneficiary children as measured by children’s progression 
through grades, the likelihood of passing critical transition points and their performance 
in standardized tests. It falls into the fourth category and, while relying on survey data, 
uses a similar empirical approach as Attanasio et al. (2005) do.  
To my knowledge, there is only one study that investigates Juntos’ impacts on cognitive 
skills: Andersen et. al (2015) study the impacts of Juntos upon nutritional and 
anthropometric scores as well as language development and grade attainment among 
young children aged 7-8 years, and find no effect on the latter. Impacts upon 
anthropometric scores varied by gender and programme exposure. Perova and Vakis 
(2012) evaluate the welfare and schooling effects of Juntos using instrumental variable 
estimation and find that the programme has weak but positive effects on consumption, 
poverty reduction and the use of health services. With regards to educational 
outcomes, the authors find that Juntos has no effect on enrolment while it does raise 
school attendance. Effects increase with the length of programme exposure. Jaramillo 
and Sánchez (2011) focus on nutritional outcomes among children aged 0 to 5 years 
and find that Juntos reduces the incidence of chronic malnutrition among beneficiary 
children significantly, with a positive effect again attributed to length of exposure. 
Escobal and Benites (2012) find positive impacts upon household welfare and 





nutrition. Other evaluations of Juntos focus on the programme’s impact upon social 
engagement (Camacho, 2014) and labour supply decisions (Fernandez and 
Saldarriaga, 2014). 
3 Data 
The paper draws upon panel data from Young Lives, an international study of 
childhood poverty in four countries that tracks 12.000 children over a 15-year period.4 
The Peruvian sub-sample follows two cohorts of children since 2002 and covers more 
than 2.700 households, for which three survey waves are currently available (2002, 
2006/07, 2009). Since the survey’s objective is to provide information on childhood 
poverty and wellbeing, the sampling strategy is not fully random but rather oversamples 
poor areas. Within the chosen sentinel sites, the selection of households was at 
random (for a detailed overview of the sampling methodology, see Escobal and Flores, 
2008). The younger cohort children were aged 6-18 months at the beginning of the 
study in 2002 and had reached a mean age of 8 by 2009, while the older cohort children 
were 7-8 years old in 2002 and around 15 years in 2009. Approximately 17 percent of 
the sample lived in Juntos beneficiary families in the last survey round. Table 3 
summarizes the basic structure of the Peruvian Young Lives panel. 
Table 3: Structure of the Young Lives Panel 
    Younger cohort   Older cohort   Siblings 
Round  2002 2006/07 2009  2002 2006/07 2009  2002 2006/07 2009 
N  2052 1963 1943  714 685 678  3915 4792 4408 
Juntos  0 90 360  0 23 76  0 470 1565 
Mean age  1,00 5,33 7,91  7,98 12,35 14,93  8,32 9,41 9,29 
Boys  1027 990 980  386 368 362  2004 2412 2238 
Girls   1025 973 963   328 317 316   1911 2380 2170 
 
                                            
 
4Young Lives is coordinated by the University of Oxford and its partner institutions in the study countries. 





While the Young Lives study focuses on these selected cohort children, a vast amount 
of data is also collected for siblings and other household members. It includes 
information on the socio-economic living conditions of the household, food and non-
food expenditure, parental background and social capital, child health and 
anthropometry as well as children's school attendance, test outcomes and time use. In 
addition, I have access to geographical data from the Juntos administration, in 
particular the geographic poverty score that was used to select eligible districts in 2005 
and to determine the timing of further roll-out. 
This study will focus on an early expansion phase of Juntos, namely the years up to 
2009. During these early years, Juntos was rolled out to prioritized districts gradually 
so that it is still possible to compare treated districts with similarly poor districts that 
were not yet incorporated into the programme. The panel survey comprises an 
extensive section on livelihoods, income and consumption, which features several 
questions on Juntos participation5 through which I can identify treated households. In 
terms of impacts, the analysis will look at school enrolment and progression through 
grades in a first step. Young Lives records for each year and each child within the 
household whether s/he was enrolled, in which type of school and the last grade 
completed. Since I do not observe children at the end of their school career, the 
analysis will give me an indication of progress through school and compliance with the 
regular age-for-grade rather than final years of schooling. This is a relevant question 
for Peru, because late enrolment and temporary school suspension are a widespread 
phenomenon in rural areas6. In particular, the transition from primary to secondary 
school thus becomes a critical point with higher risk of drop-out. Beyond the Young 
Lives cohort children, my sample also includes their (half-) siblings if they were born to 
the same mother and lived in the same household in both survey rounds. 
                                            
 
5While survey wave 2009 contains a direct question on Juntos participation during the past 12 months, 
I have to reconstruct this for the second wave. This is possible because wave 3 contains enrolment date 
and information on transfer suspension and programme exit. 
6 According to UNICEF, an average of 41 percent of children aged 12-15 are in a school grade that does 





In a second step, the analysis will focus on cognitive skills and learning outcomes. 
Young Lives administers a range of tests covering numerical and receptive vocabulary 
skills to the cohort child and selected siblings. For the purpose of this study, the 
Peabody Picture and Vocabulary Test (PPVT) and a math test will be used7. The PPVT 
is a widely used test that was originally developed in 1959 in English language but has 
later been adapted to Spanish for Latin America (PPVT-R, for detailed information see 
Cueto and León, 2012). It measures receptive vocabulary skills by presenting, in 
increasing order of difficulty, pictures to the child who has to choose the word that best 
matches them. The measures correspond to the highest item reached out of a total of 
125 items for the Spanish version, hence younger children tend to score lower on 
average by design. The test, which is untimed and norm-referenced, has been adapted 
to Quechua as the most widely used indigenous language in Peru by a panel of 
experts. The math test slightly differed between survey wave 2006/07 and 2009 
because of the age differences and the need to increase difficulty. In 2006/07, the 
younger cohort (aged 4-5 years) was administered a 15-item-test of basic numeric 
concepts8 while the older cohort (aged 11-12 years) completed a more difficult 10-item 
subset of the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS) of 2003, 
testing basic numerical operations. In 2009, both cohorts took a test comprised of a 
20-item arithmetic operations section and a second section testing quantitative and 
number notions (9 items for the younger cohort) respectively algebra and geometry 
(10 items for the older cohort)9. The tests were timed and no aids such as calculators 
or books were allowed. 
The siblings did not participate in the math test (by survey design), while they did take 
the PPVT in the third round as long as they were at least 4 years old. For this reason, 
the analysis of learning outcomes will focus on the smaller sample of Young Lives 
cohort children only. Further, it is important to note that these are no school tests, but 
                                            
 
7Young Lives administers several other tests, however, these were either not continued through both 
survey wave 2 and 3, or they were changed such that they are not comparable over time. 
8This refers to the quantitative subtest of the Cognitive Developmental Assessment (CDA) developed 
by the International Evaluation Association (IEA) to assess the cognitive development of 4-year olds. 
For more information, see Cueto et. al, 2009. 
9The tests used were a combination of the TIMMS study 2003 referred to above and selected items from 





were administered as part of the Young Lives survey. This means that children were 
tested regardless of their school enrolment status, and test conditions were 
comparable across regions. Table A1 (Annex) summarizes the outcomes that will be 
analyzed, while Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for these outcomes for the post-
treatment round of 2009. It shows that a high proportion of children in both groups is 
enrolled in school, while more than half are still in primary school, and about a third of 
children from non-beneficiary households compared to about one fourth from 
beneficiary households attend secondary school. The mean child has completed fourth 
grade. On average, this seems to be in line with their age. In terms of scores on the 
PPVT and math tests, beneficiary children tend to score significantly lower than their 
peers from non-Juntos families. These figures refer to the whole sample of children 
before matching and include families from urban areas including the province of Lima 
as well as more remote rural areas. 
Table 4: Outcomes (child-level) by treatment status in 2009 
 Non-Juntos children Juntos children Difference 
 Mean N Mean N Points t-stat 
Enrolled 0.93 4074 0.95 1095 -0.01 -1.27 
Highest grade 4.43 4074 4.17 1095 0.26 2.32 
Age-for-grade -0.55 4074 -0.27 1095 -0.28 -7.99 
Primary complete 0.40 4074 0.34 1095 0.06 3.68 
In secondary 0.29 4074 0.23 1095 0.05 3.59 
PPVT raw score 72.39 2102 50.08 442 22.31 19.03 
Math raw score 14.74 2069 10.33 420 4.42 14.92 
 
4 Identification strategy 
The impact that Juntos participation has on educational outcomes of beneficiary 
children can be expressed as the additional benefit that an individual gains from 
participating in Juntos compared to the outcome in case of his or her non-participation. 
The fundamental problem of any evaluation is that we cannot observe an individual in 





matching and difference-in-difference (MDID) approach as outlined in Heckman et al 
(1997) to identify the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). MDID combines 
the advantages of both matching and difference-in-difference estimation while also 
relying on the assumptions of the two methods. According to Abadie (2005), such two-
step semi-parametric estimation has advantages over a multivariate difference-in-
difference estimation when pre-treatment characteristics that may be associated with 
the dynamics of the outcome variables are unbalanced. Kernel matching, which 
amounts to a weighting scheme based on the propensity score, imposes on average 
the same distribution of covariates for treated and control observations. The propensity 
score is the only function that needs to be estimated in the first step, it models the 
selection process. The second step estimates the differences in outcomes, where the 
common trend assumption of the conventional difference-in-difference can then be 
relaxed to holding conditional on a balanced (weighted) distribution of the specified 
covariates.  
Matching identifies control observations that resemble the treated ones as closely as 
possible in observable characteristics, it matches “statistical twins”. Identification relies 
on the assumption that selection into treatment is determined by observable 
characteristics and not confounded by unobservable characteristics that affect 
outcomes at the same time (conditional independence assumption, CIA). In other 
words, expected outcomes, given non-participation in treatment T and conditional on 
observable characteristics X, should be the same for participants and non-participants: 
 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖|𝑇𝑇 = 1,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖|𝑇𝑇 = 0,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) (1) 
This is a strong assumption that may not hold if unobserved factors such as motivation 
or ability systematically differ by treatment status. The ATT can be estimated under 
arguably less restrictive assumptions if panel data are available and matching can be 
combined with difference-in-difference. The latter controls for selection on 
unobservables, but rests on the assumption that both groups would have experienced 
the same trends over time in the absence of treatment (common time trend). It 
measures the treatment effect as the difference in outcomes between treated and non-
treated net of their pre-existing difference before treatment. Combining matching with 
difference-in-difference allows me to control both for observable and unobservable 





MDID rests upon two key identifying assumptions. First, conditional on observables 𝑋𝑋, 
the evolution of unobservables (captured by the error term 𝑢𝑢) over time t is independent 
of treatment status 𝑇𝑇:   
 𝐸𝐸 [(𝑢𝑢1𝑖𝑖  −  𝑢𝑢0𝑖𝑖) | 𝑇𝑇 = 1,  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖]  =  𝐸𝐸 [(𝑢𝑢1𝑖𝑖  −  𝑢𝑢0𝑖𝑖) | 𝑇𝑇 = 0,  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖]  (2) 
 
In other words, identification rests on the assumption that, in the absence of treatment, 
both groups would have experienced the same time trends. Secondly, there must be 
common support:  
 0 < 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (𝑇𝑇1𝑖𝑖 | 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)  < 1 (3) 
   
This requires that the probability 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 of selection into treatment 𝑇𝑇 cannot be fully 
explained by observables X; instead, there must be control observations with a 
probability of treatment in the same range as that of treated observations.  
MDID hence estimates the treatment effect as: 
 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = ���𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦0𝑖𝑖�
𝑖𝑖





where y is the outcome of interest, subscripts 0 and 1 indicate the time period before 
and after treatment respectively, subscripts i and j indicate that the individual belongs 
to the treatment and control group respectively, and w is a weighting factor. The weight 
w is defined by the matching method chosen (in the present case a Kernel-based 
estimator) and represents the weight of the statistical twin j for treated person i. 
4.1 Targeting and selection into Juntos 
Juntos did not include an evaluation design from the start and naturally, programme 
participation is not assigned randomly. Rather, the targeting process is a three-step 
procedure: at the first level (geographic targeting), eligible districts are selected 
according to a composite geographic score that takes into account various poverty 





extent of exposure to political violence in the previous decade10. Based on this score, 
which was calculated according to a 2005 census (renewed in 2007), 638 districts were 
prioritised for roll-out during the first programme years; further districts were included 
from 2009 onwards. In the second step, the individual targeting, eligible households 
are selected according to a proxy-means score that takes into account the following 
criteria: the ratio of illiterate women residing in the household, the ratio of minors that 
do not attend school, access to industrial sources of fuel for cooking, dwelling 
characteristics and access to basic services. Most of these targeting indicators are 
long-term and not easily changeable in response to expectations about the 
programme’s inception (Ashenfelter’s dip). Even for those that may easily be adjusted 
such as school participation, it is unlikely that this would have been the case here 
because the information was recorded as part of the regular census and detailed 
criteria on eligibility for benefits were not disclosed beforehand. In a final step 
(community validation), the list of eligible households is verified by a commission of 
community members, and local and national representatives of the Juntos 
administration in order to minimize both inclusion and exclusion errors. 
Looking at our sample, Table 5 compares families that have never been Juntos 
beneficiaries in the period under analysis and those that have become Juntos 
beneficiaries at some point between programme start in 2005 and 2009. It shows that 
on average, Juntos beneficiary families live in larger households, they are less well off 
in terms of expenditure (total per capita expenditure lies on average more than 50 
percent below that of non-Juntos families) and in terms of wealth11. They are far more 
likely to live in rural areas where reaching the nearest primary school takes on average 
7 more minutes. Perhaps more striking is the fact that the mother in the household has 
completed on average less than half the years of schooling compared to those in non-
Juntos households (less than 4 years as compared to over 8 years). Juntos families 
tend to live in districts that were ranked in the poorest two quintiles (in terms of poverty 
                                            
 
10For further details on the algorithm applied and an extensive discussion of the targeting process, see 
Escobal et al. (2012). 
11 The wealth index is a composite score that measures by equal weighting: (i) the housing quality in 
terms of size and building materials, (ii) possession of consumer durables, (iii) access to services of 





incidence) as of 2005 with a prevalence of malnutrition among children aged 6-9 years 
of a staggering 45 percent compared to just under 20 percent in non-Juntos districts in 
this sample. It is evident that beneficiary households systematically differ from non-
beneficiary households. In the first step, I will hence apply matching to find a suitable 
control group by replicating the programme’s targeting criteria as closely as possible 
with the data.  
Table 5: Household characteristics in 2006/07 by treatment status 
 Non-Juntos HH Juntos HH Difference 
 Mean N Mean N Points t-stat 
Household size 5.36 2103 6.18 320 -0.83 -6.80 
Wealth index 0.53 2103 0.26 320 0.27 21.32 
Total expenditure 179.45 2103 83.46 320 96.00 9.60 
Ethnic: Mestizo 0.91 2103 0.97 320 -0.07 -4.03 
Ethnic: White 0.06 2103 0.02 320 0.04 2.69 
Mother’s education 
(in years) 8.56 2103 3.54 320 5.02 20.14 
Mother’s age 33.80 2103 34.23 320 -0.43 -0.84 
Rural (1 if yes) 0.19 2103 0.78 320 -0.60 -25.26 
Minutes to school 12.94 2103 20.31 320 -7.36 -9.67 
District poverty 
quintile* 2.82 2103 1.29 320 1.52 22.60 
District rate of child 
malnutrition in %* 19.64 2103 45.72 320 -26.08 -34.44 
* The district poverty quintile and the district malnutrition rate are drawn from the 2005 census and were used by the Juntos 
administration in the geographical targeting. The district poverty quintile ranks from 1 (poorest) to 5 (least poor) and draws 
upon a multidimensional poverty index. The malnutrition rate refers to the age group 6-9 years. 
 
Nonetheless, a biased selection may occur if only the best informed or most mobile 
from the population of eligible households actually participate. The programme design 
reduces such risk in several ways: Once a district is selected, a survey of each 
household is conducted in order to determine eligibility. The programme administration 
then pro-actively approaches eligible households to explain and offer affiliation with 
Juntos12. Hence, the risk that eligible households are unaware of the programme and 
thus do not register is low. The sequential regional roll-out may reduce incentives for 
                                            
 
12 This was the case in the first programme years (Escobal et al, 2012). Nowadays, households are not 





moving into a (poorer) programme district if a later incorporation of the home district 
may be expected while moving is costly. Also, a household has to live in the district for 
at least six months before qualifying for the transfer. Finally, the community validation 
aims to minimize discretionary powers of local officials or community representatives 
by ensuring a mixed composition of members. Furthermore, various channels exist for 
families to complain and demand a re-assessment of eligibility. 
Even if we thus believe that the programme rules successfully target the poorest, there 
may be systematic unobserved differences if for example some parents value 
education more than others or place more trust in the local health services. Hence, in 
order to control for any unobserved pre-existing differences between the control and 
treatment groups, I will apply difference-in-difference estimation on the matched 
sample. Applied to the present case of Juntos, MDID compares the difference in 
outcomes between children of families that are similar in observable characteristics 
except for the fact that some benefitted from Juntos while others did not, taking into 
account the differences that existed already before treatment. The core identifying 
assumptions as outlined above will now be discussed further. 
4.2 Matching and the common support assumption 
As described in Table 5, Juntos households differ from non-Juntos households in 
observable characteristics that may simultaneously affect the outcome variables. 
Hence, I apply a Kernel-matching estimator by applying an Epanechnikov Kernel with 
a bandwidth of 0.0513 (respectively 0.06 and 0.07 for different subsamples, see below) 
to restrict my control group to those observations that best resemble the former group 
in terms of observable characteristics. A Kernel estimator has the advantage that it 
uses weighted averages (depending on the distance of the propensity score) of 
                                            
 
13 The bandwidth essentially functions as a smoothing parameter of the Kernel density function that has 
to be chosen carefully to balance between bias and efficiency of the estimator. The bandwidth of 0.05 




, 𝐴𝐴 = min (�𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥), 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥)
1.34 ) according to 
Wilcox (2012) and Silverman (1986), with n referring to the sample size of those observations in the 
common support, IQR referring to the interquartile range and x referring to the estimated propensity 





(nearly) all control observations14 and thus makes use of more information, thereby 
reducing the variance. This may be advisable when the number of control observations 
is large, as in the present case (Caliendo et al, 2008). Since the treatment itself can 
affect matching covariates, matching is best undertaken on the basis of pre-treatment 
characteristics (Blundell and Dias, 2009). I therefore restrict the treatment group to 
children whose families joined Juntos at some point between 2007 and 2009 in order 
to compare outcomes before and after treatment. This way, all children in my sample 
were non-beneficiaries in the observation year 2006/07, while 16 percent benefitted 
from Juntos in the observation year 2009. 
Table 6:  Logit estimation on treatment status 
Variable Unmatched Matched Treated Control p-value Treated Control p-value 
Child's age 8.13 8.14 0.896 8.12 8.23 0.518 
Child's sex 
(girl=1) 20.89 13.21 0.991 18.16 16.48 0.477 
Indigenous 
language (=1) 1.82 1.22 0.000 1.81 1.81 0.939 
Wealth index 0.26 0.50 0.000 0.27 0.28 0.208 
Total per cap. 
expenditure 78.71 165.54 0.000 79.73 84.61 0.361 
Household 
size 0.09 0.09 0.000 0.08 0.08 0.632 
Children 
aged 6-18 0.07 0.10 0.000 0.07 0.05 0.253 
Generations 
in HH 3.09 8.00 0.448 3.21 3.55 0.858 
Out-of-school 
ratio 1.64 1.18 0.224 1.61 1.62 0.585 
Female-
headed HH 6.83 5.73 0.079 6.76 6.89 0.373 
Mother's 
education 2.24 2.27 0.000 2.21 2.24 0.016 
Rural site 
(=1) 8.00 8.05 0.000 7.98 7.95 0.770 
Time to 
school 0.49 0.48 0.000 0.49 0.50 0.581 
District index 0.54 0.06 0.000 0.51 0.52 0.986 
 
                                            
 
14 Depending on whether an Epanechnikov or Gaussian function is applied, the estimation uses all 
control observations (Gaussian) or just those within a specified caliper of the distance to the treated 





My sample includes children of both age cohorts and their siblings if these were at least 
six years old in 2009 and lived in the household in both survey rounds. In choosing the 
matching covariates, I try to replicate the actual targeting criteria outlined above as 
closely as possible. In a first step, I exclude all households from the department of 
Lima (spanning both the capital and surrounding provinces) since this densely 
populated area may not serve as a good control group for treated rural districts. Since 
the range of the geographical score is still fairly large, I include the score itself in the 
matching covariates to ensure balancing between the two groups. As further 
geographical controls I include the distance to the next primary and secondary schools 
and whether the child lives in a rural or urban district. Household characteristics include 
the family’s wealth and expenditure situation, the family size and composition, the ratio 
of minors in the household that do not attend school, as well as the mother’s years of 
schooling. Individual characteristics include age, sex and ethnic background of the 
child. 
Table 6 reports the balancing of these covariates before and after matching: it shows 
that matching achieves a balanced distribution with respect to all but one variable, 
namely the mother’s years of education. In fact, among the treated group, more than 
50 percent of mothers have only two years or less of formal education while in the 
control group this figure lies at only 14 percent. This unbalanced distribution is a source 
of concern since we would expect the educational status of the mother to affect that of 
her children. Since this relationship is, however, a positive one, it would likely introduce 
a downward bias in the estimation. 
Graph A1 (Annex) shows the propensity score before and after matching, as well as 
the region of common support. It confirms that both groups share a rather large area 
of common support, although 6 out of the 816 children from the treated group have to 
be dropped because they lie outside of this region. Further, Graph A2 shows that the 
distribution of key pre-treatment characteristics, which may plausibly be related to the 
outcomes measured, can be balanced through the matching specification. The 
matched sample now includes 6.260 observations, of which 1.620 belong to the 
treatment group (2.320 respectively 810 children per round). They cover the age range 
of 6 to 18 years and have a mean age of 10.8 years in the post-treatment round of 





around approximately 8 years (younger cohort) and 14 years (older cohort), and fewer 
observations (siblings) in between. A large share of the sample is hence still of primary 
school age (up to grade 6). Graph A4 shows the grade distribution by enrolment status: 
there is a corresponding peak of children, which have finished first grade, while there 
is no clear peak at later grades. It further shows that the majority of children is 
registered in school, while the highest risk of dropout seems to be around grade 6.  
4.3 Common trend assumption 
The common trend assumption essentially stipulates that, in the absence of Juntos, 
the trend in enrolment rates, progression through grades, and in learning outcomes 
would have developed the same for the treatment and control groups. In other words, 
the change over time in outcomes observed for the control group represents a good 
counterfactual of the changes beneficiaries would have experienced had they not 
benefitted from treatment. Naturally, we cannot test this assumption; nonetheless, 
trends observed in the period just before Juntos began to operate provide some 
support for it. 
Graphs A5 and A6 (Annex) depict the trends in enrolment and progression through 
grades from 2002 to 2006/07, the years just before the families in our sample began 
to benefit from Juntos. The sample used here includes the same children as long as 
these were between the age of 6 and 18 in 2006/07 (it hence excludes the younger 
cohort children altogether). Graph A4 shows that, while mean enrolment rates slightly 
differ between the two groups, the trend over time runs parallel. In a similar way, trends 
in progression through grades do not differ significantly between the two groups. Table 
A2 (Annex) reports the difference-in-difference estimation for the same time period and 
confirms that trends in outcomes between the two groups do not statistically differ from 
each other. Unfortunately, the PPVT and math tests were not yet administered in the 
first Young Lives survey wave of 2002 so that the pre-treatment trend cannot be 
observed. It seems plausible though to argue that if trends in school participation ran 






Having balanced the two groups in terms of observable characteristics before 
treatment, I apply difference-in difference estimation in a second step. In our 
estimation, the first set of outcomes relates to school participation as measured by 
enrolment status, years of schooling, transition from primary to secondary school and 
age-for-grade. Intuitively, the mere compliance with conditionalities should have a 
positive effect on enrolment, while the effect on years of schooling is ambiguous: it 
may be positive if beneficiaries are induced to stay in school and advance through 
grades, while it may be zero (or even negative) if the incentive is only to comply with 
attendance requirements. The same reasoning applies to the child’s grade relative to 
his or her age, and the transition from primary to secondary school: stringent 
attendance requirements should lower the risk of drop-out at this transition point. 
However, it may not if children repeat grades or if opportunity costs of schooling 
increase exponentially with age and outweigh the financial incentive. Juntos requires 
a minimum attendance of 85 percent of schooling hours, on which schools report to 
the Juntos office every two months. In case of non-compliance with conditionalities, a 
family will be suspended from the programme temporarily but qualifies again for the 
payment once conditionalities are fulfilled. 
The second set relates to learning outcomes. The anticipated effect is not clear-cut: 
regular attendance may facilitate better learning outcomes and test scores. However, 
mere presence in school may not be enough to facilitate an actual transfer of 
information into enhanced cognitive skills. While the intention of CCTs is to get children 
into school, prevent early drop out and hence foster learning, these gains may not 
materialize if schooling quality is low or further support mechanisms for disadvantaged 
children are not available. 
5.1 Impacts upon school participation 
Table 7 reports the results for the first set of outcomes. The parameter of interest is 





and non-beneficiary families.15 The simple differences between the treated group (T) 
and the control group (C) are reported for the baseline and follow-up period 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 16 
Panel A reports the outcomes for the pooled sample. The point estimates suggest that 
children from Juntos families are about 5 percentage points more likely to be enrolled 
in school, while the point estimates on years of schooling, albeit positive, are rather 
imprecisely estimated by the difference-in-difference method and thus statistically not 
significant. The same holds for the probability of finishing primary school and transiting 
to secondary school. Highly statistically significant is the difference in age-for-grade, 
which suggests that Juntos children are catching up with their regular age for grade: 
while they were are on average older than their peers of the same grade before 
programme start, this difference fades. While overall these results may be sobering at 
first sight, descriptive statistics show that school participation and enrolment rates are 
rather high in primary school from the outset (mean net enrolment rate of 93 percent). 
This is different for secondary schooling where mean school participation is 
significantly lower (83 percent) and differences run both along a rural-urban divide and 
between income groups (see Table 1, MINEDU 2014). In this sense, the pooled sample 
may hide heterogeneous effects that differ between age groups. 
Hence, we perform a separate analysis for children in the post-treatment age groups 
of primary (up to grade 6) and secondary (grade 7 to 11) school respectively. Panel B 
reports the MDID outcomes for the younger group below the age of 12 years. For this 
group, the outcomes concerning the transition from primary to secondary school are 
not yet relevant since this transition only happens around the age of 12 years. The 
results for the relevant outcomes show no significant difference between the groups: 
while children participating in Juntos have a higher point estimate compared to their 
non-treated peers in terms of probability of enrolment, the difference is statistically not 
significant. As argued above, this is not surprising given the generally high participation 
                                            
 
15 An additional control related to the interview date are included (but not reported in the table) to control 
for any variation in time passed between the two survey rounds, since each was carried out over a time 
span of several months. 
16 The results are robust to clustering standard errors at the household level instead, bootstrapping 





in primary school. The same holds for trends in years of schooling and conformity with 
the regular age-for-grade. 
Table 7: Juntos impacts upon schooling outcomes (MDID) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 







Panel A: Pooled Sample         
Baseline 































      
Observations 6260 6260 6260 6260 6260 
R-squared 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.07 
Panel B: Age group primary school (under 12 years) 
Baseline      
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Follow-up      
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Observations 3346 3346 3346   
R-squared 0.42 0.35 0.21   
Panel C: Age group secondary school (12-18 years) 
Baseline      










Follow-up      




















      
Observations 1956 1956 1956 1956 1956 
R-squared 0.04 0.38 0.02 0.34 0.22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the district level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Kernel bandwidth: 0.05 (Panel A), 0.06 (Panel B), 0.07 (Panel C) 
Matching covariates include those listed in Table 6. 
 
The next panel C performs the same analysis for the older age group of 12 years or 





group. Here, the positive impact upon enrolment rates17 is significant at the 5 percent 
level and suggests a difference of 7.3 percentage points. A significant positive impact 
appears for years of schooling, which suggests that children from Juntos families 
accumulate on average just over 4 months more schooling over time than non-treated 
children. This is consistent with the positive impact upon enrolment that indicates a 
lower dropout rate among Juntos children. It may further be due to less repetition: 
column 3 shows that Juntos children progress on average faster through grades. While 
they are on average almost half a year older than their peers of the same grade before 
treatment, they close this gap over time and move closer to a regular age for grade. 
The impact is approximately of the same magnitude as that on years of schooling. 
Column 4 tests whether treatment is associated with a higher likelihood of completing 
primary school. The effect is positive albeit only weakly significant, and driven by a 
closing of the pre-treatment gap. Similarly for the probability of making the transition 
from primary to secondary school. The impact of 9 percentage points is weakly 
significant at the 10 percent level and larger than that on enrolment. Hence, the impact 
may be a cumulative effect of less dropout after primary school and faster progression, 
be that a result of the minimum attendance requirement of 85 percent, better 
performance or other driving forces.   
In a nutshell, Table 7 suggests that, on average Juntos participation has no statistically 
significant impact upon schooling outcomes of primary school-aged children in terms 
of their enrolment probability or progress through school grades. We detect a positive 
impact, however, upon enrolment, years of schooling and the probability of transiting 
from primary to secondary school among children aged 12 years and above. 
Descriptive statistics indicate that this age group is at higher risk of school dropout, 
and that the transition from primary to secondary school is a critical point. If we look at 
simple differences between the groups in the two time periods, it becomes apparent 
that positive impacts are often due to beneficiary children catching up with their peers 
over time. While for most outcomes, beneficiary children started at a lower level (except 
                                            
 
17 Note that this variable actually refers to being in school or having completed secondary school; as 
such, the outcome is not coded zero for children that are not enrolled because they completed 





for enrolment), they catch up by the post-treatment period. This can plausibly be 
related to programme conditionalities, which not only require enrolment of children 
aged 6 years and above, but also a minimum and regular attendance requirement of 
85 percent. This observation further supports the MDID strategy since it becomes 
apparent that even after matching, Juntos children systematically start out with lower 
outcome levels than their non-treated peers. The difference-in-difference estimation 
accounts for this pre-treatment difference in outcomes and measures the change 
experienced over time. 
5.2 Impacts upon learning outcomes 
Table 8 looks at learning outcomes as measured by the PPVT and math tests. Scores 
are standardized by age strata in order to make them comparable over time and age 
groups in a linear difference-in-difference model.18 Since the tests were administered 
to siblings in the post-treatment round only while the Young Lives cohort children were 
tested in both rounds, I need to reduce the sample to the cohort children only. An 
additional control dummy to capture whether a child took the PPVT test in a language 
other than his or her mother tongue19 is included.  
Column 1 and 2 report the results for the PPVT and math tests of the younger cohort 
children. In both cases, the coefficients are negative but only in case of the math score 
is the difference statistically significant. For the older cohort children, aged between 14 
and 15 years in the post-treatment round, the coefficients also appear negative but 
insignificant. The results for the older cohort need to be treated with caution since the 
number of treated observations only reaches 94, hence the relatively large standard 
errors. The negative sign of the coefficients seems counter-intuitive at first since there 
appears no straightforward reason to believe that Juntos participation would have a 
negative effect on learning outcomes. Graphs A7 and A8 show the trend in PPVT and 
math scores over time: it becomes apparent that both groups have improved their 
                                            
 
18 The PPVT test has been standardized using a z-score standardization while for the math tests, a 
quintile range standardization was applied. The standardization was applied in age strata of 9 months. 
19 Children were free to choose their preferred language and a number of children chose to take the test 






scores over time while beneficiary children have done so by fewer points than their 
counterparts. In the younger cohort, treated children increased their math test score 
by on average 1.5 points (approximately ½ standard deviation) less than non-treated 
children did. 
Table 8: Juntos impacts upon learning outcomes (MDID) 
Outcomes Younger cohort Older cohort 
PPVT Math PPVT Math 
Baseline 























     
Observations 1491 1571 496 438 
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.02 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the district level. 
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Kernel bandwidth: 0.05 (younger cohort), 0.04 (older cohort) 
Matching covariates include those listed in Table 6 and the child’s age in months, 
siblings rank and whether s/he attended pre-school. 
 
A further note of caution applies to the measurement of the younger cohort’s math 
score since the baseline CDA in the pre-treatment round only tests basic numerical 
concepts and hence may not be a good predictor of later math abilities. If we look at 
simple differences only, however, it becomes apparent that the negative impact is 
driven by post-treatment differences: while pre-treatment scores do not statistically 
differ between the groups, they are significantly lower in the post-treatment round for 
both tests (younger cohort) respectively PPVT (older cohort). In fact, the negative effect 
appears even stronger in the first difference estimation: the differences in PPVT and 
math scores are statistically significant for the younger cohort, while for the older cohort 
only the difference in PPVT scores is weakly significant.20 The stronger effect in the 
                                            
 
20 The table reports estimates based on standardized test scores and shows, estimates based on raw 





first different estimation is consistent with the fact that Juntos children already had 
lower mean test scores in the pre-treatment round. 
When interpreting these results, one needs to examine carefully what the 
counterfactual of no treatment may be. Juntos should increase school participation 
both at the extensive and intensive margin if households comply with conditionalities, 
and if the incentive provided lowers the opportunity costs of schooling significantly for 
at least some families21. On an individual level, the counterfactual may hence be to 
attend fewer school hours or to drop out of school altogether. On an aggregate district 
level, the increased demand for schooling may lead to overcrowding or less stringent 
criteria for passing school in order to prevent needy children from dropping out and 
hence losing the transfer. Thus, treatment may have no positive impact on learning 
outcomes if school quality and infrastructure are not enhanced in parallel, or worse the 
treatment effect may even be negative if classrooms become overcrowded. Although 
I do control for regional characteristics related to poverty levels and distance to 
schools, unfortunately I cannot control for factors related to school infrastructure due 
to a lack of available data.  In this sense, the quality of school infrastructure may be 
one channel to explain any potential relation between the presence of Juntos and 
individual learning progress, and is most certainly one that merits further investigation. 
Finally, I have tested for the length of exposure to treatment. This did not change 
results significantly nor did it give evidence for positive marginal effects of an extra year 
of treatment, which may be due to the fact that I cannot yet observe long-term trends. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has evaluated the effects of Juntos participation on educational attainment 
as measured by school participation and learning outcomes. Juntos constitutes a 
typical CCT programme that provides incentives to poor families to invest in their 
children’s education by ensuring regular school participation. The paper has adopted 
                                            
 
21 Recall that previous absence or presence in school is no eligibility criteria, families can claim the 
benefit regardless of whether their children complied with the conditionalities before programme start 
already. Hence, if only those families enroll that would comply with conditionalities even in the absence 





a combined matching and difference-in-difference approach to analyze whether Juntos 
can be associated with higher levels of schooling reached and improved learning 
outcomes. It has focused on a sample of over 2.300 children aged between 6 and 18 
years in the period under analysis, which were first surveyed in 2006/07 (pre-treatment) 
and a second time in 2009 (post-treatment).  
The estimated results are mixed: they show no effect on school participation of primary 
school-aged children, which is not surprising given the high primary school enrolment 
rates in Peru from the outset. A positive impact is observed for children of secondary 
school age: treated children have higher enrolment probability, seem to progress faster 
through grades and are more likely to finish primary school and enter secondary school 
holding age constant. This is consistent with evidence from other countries such as 
Mexico, where CCTs significantly decreased the risk of dropout at the transition from 
primary to secondary school (Schultz, 2004). It is, however, too early to assess whether 
any positive effect on years of schooling persists through and up to completion of 
secondary school, given that Juntos had not been around yet long enough in the post-
treatment round of 2009 and given that I do not observe final years of schooling. The 
findings for learning outcomes are less encouraging: programme participation has no 
effect on learning outcomes as measured by PPVT and math test scores of the older 
cohort children, and even a negative effect on math scores of the younger cohort. 
The links between Juntos participation and learning outcomes are not clear-cut: the 
programme may have a positive impact that is transmitted via the attendance 
requirement and the increased awareness of the value of education that the 
programme promotes. There are, however, no incentives attached to learning 
outcomes or performance measures nor have explicit supply side interventions been 
linked to the programme. A negative relationship as observed for the younger cohort 
seems worrisome and may point to a potential mismatch between increased demand 
for schooling services in treatment areas and their supply in terms of quality and 
infrastructure. CCTs have often been criticized for focusing on the demand side of 
human capital investment only, neglecting supply factors that may influence schooling 
decisions and outcomes. While the evidence of this paper is insufficient to draw such 
conclusion, the link between CCTs and learning progress as well as the role of school 





In a similar fashion, this paper has not addressed heterogeneous effects that may differ 
between different family types, ethnic background or risk groups. As such, larger 
families may find it more difficult to comply with conditionalities since more children 
have to fulfil them while the transfer itself stays flat (effectively decreasing in relative 
importance if younger siblings reach schooling age). Evidence from qualitative 
interviews22 furthermore suggests that transaction costs related to the fulfilment of 
conditionalities (in particular waiting times at health centres) and cash withdrawal may 
differ substantially between sparsely populated rural areas and more densely 
populated ones.  From a policy perspective, this analysis has also not evaluated the 
benefits of a conditional versus an unconditional transfer. As such, we cannot 
determine whether any positive effects observed are primarily due to a shift in the 
budget constraint (i.e. the transfer) or to a decrease in the opportunity cost of schooling 
(i.e. the conditionality). While this may not be a relevant question when the main 
concern is the evaluation of impacts upon human capital formation, it would be a core 
question when weighing the costs of different programme alternatives against their 
benefits. In this sense, administrative costs related to the monitoring of compliance 
with conditionalities would have to be weighed against alternative uses such as 
increasing the transfer, covering a larger target population or investing in school 
infrastructure. 
In summary, this paper has offered some support to earlier findings from different 
countries that attest CCTs a positive impact upon school participation of secondary 
school aged children that may be at risk of school dropout at or after the transition to 
secondary school. It has not found any evidence for improved learning outcomes that 
may result from higher school participation, but rather points at further analysis needed 
to investigate potential links between CCTs and skills formation.  
                                            
 
22 Qualitiative interviews related to programme participation and effects have been conducted with 
beneficiary families, school directors and local Juntos administrators in 4 districts in 2 departments 
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Annex – Tables 
 
Table A1: Outcome variables 
Outcome Variable Sample 
Schooling outcomes 





Grade Highest grade completed (in years) 
Age-for-grade Age deviation from regular age for grade attended (benchmark: 6-7 years in first grade) 
Primary Child has completed primary school (yes/no) 
In secondary Child has entered secondary school (yes/no) 
Learning outcomes  




Standardized quintile range (age-stratified) of the raw 




Table A2: Diff-in-diff estimation on pre-treatment 
trends 
 Enrolled Highest grade 
 
    
post*T -0.000148 -0.122  
 (0.0430) (0.200)  
T 0.00808 0.140  
 (0.0412) (0.0884)  
post 0.403*** 2.286***  
 (0.0347) (0.157)  
Constant 0.567*** 0.686***  
 (0.0333) (0.0654)  
    
Observations 2,952 2,940  
R-squared 0.233 0.287  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by HH  
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